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Abstract1 
 
This paper uses provincial-level data for Argentina to test for the causal 
relationship between electricity distribution and health. It examines the impact of 
privatization on two output measures: incidence of low birth weight and child 
mortality rates caused by food poisoning. Privatization improves service coverage 
which, through the use of refrigerators, may improve nutritional intake. 
Privatization also results in a reduction in the frequency of interruptions, and thus 
may reduce the likelihood of food poisoning. Though the evidence indicates that 
privatization reduced the frequency of low birth weight and child mortality rates 
caused by food poisoning, the results are not strong enough to inform the policy 
debate with respect to the benefits of privatization for the welfare of the poor.  
                                                          
1 The comments of Sebastián Galiani are gratefully acknowledged. We want to thank Verónica Chapperon for 
research assistance and Eduardo Suárez, Enrique Abeyá, and Pablo Durán for help in providing nutritional survey 
data. We also want to thank Sebastián Galiani, Paul Gertler, and Ernesto Schargrodsky for providing us the data on 
the privatization of water services. 
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1. Introduction 
During the 1990s, Argentina undertook structural reforms including a privatization program that 
transferred most of its national, provincial, and municipal state-owned enterprises to private 
hands. Among these reforms was the privatization of most electricity companies. Provincial 
governments are responsible for delivering electricity services and not all of them decided to 
privatize these services; those that did, did so at different times during the decade. More 
precisely, between 1992 and 1998, 17 electricity companies covering 70 percent of the 
population were privatized.  
There are several studies analyzing the impact of Argentina’s electricity privatization 
program on some general measures of welfare. Chisari, Estache, and Romero (1999) use a 
calibrated general equilibrium model to assess the welfare gains of utilities privatization for 
private consumers. They find positive overall welfare gains whose size, and their effect on the 
distribution of income, strongly depend on the quality of regulation. Benitez, Chisari, and 
Estache (2003) modify the model of Chisari, Estache, and Romero (1999) to study the impact of 
utilities privatization on the public sector. They show that better regulation increases consumer 
welfare but at the expense of public revenues. From a social point of view, consumer gains are 
higher than the loss in revenue. Delfino and Cesarin (2003) use data from the Greater Buenos 
Aires area to measure the consumer surplus from the privatization of several public services. 
They measure the impact both for initial consumers and for newcomers, and find that for some 
services—electricity among them—welfare changes are positive. There is also a study by 
Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) on the impact of water privatization on child mortality 
in Argentina, which shows that privatization reduced child mortality, especially in the poorest 
municipalities that privatized.  
Our hypothesis is that service expansions and quality improvements associated with the 
privatization of electric companies have had a positive effect on health outcomes, particularly 
among the poor. Privatization increased access to electricity and thus allowed a number of 
households, whose only constraint was the lack of electricity in their homes, to have a 
refrigerator. Refrigerator use improves nutrition intake. Privatization also reduces the frequency 
and duration of interruptions per customer, which may reduce the likelihood of food poisoning. 
Thus, we use the variation in ownership of provincial electricity companies over time and space 
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to identify the causal effect of privatization on some measures of public health related to 
nutrition and food poisoning.  
The paper is structured as followed. Section 2 summarizes the characteristics of 
electricity reform in Argentina. Section 3 reviews the literature on the public health aspects of 
nutrition and food quality, while Section 4 develops the main potential pathways by which the 
privatization of electricity distribution in Argentina might have had a positive effect on public 
health. Section 5 describes the dataset and Section 6 presents the empirical strategy and the 
results. Section 7 concludes and provides some policy implications. 
2. Argentina’s Electricity Reform 
Though the electricity industry was wholly state and provincially owned at the beginning of the 
1990s, more than 80 percent of the generation sector, all of the transmission sector, and about 70 
percent of the distribution sectors in Argentina were transferred to private ownership by 1998 
(for details of the privatization process, see Pollitt, 2004 and Galiani et al., 2002). 
The process started with the division of SEGBA (a firm owned by the federal 
government) into three companies in 1992. Two of the new companies, EDENOR and EDESUR, 
each covered half of the city of Buenos Aires and the area of Greater Buenos Aires, while a third 
firm, EDELAP, covered the area of Greater La Plata. These companies covered almost 40 
percent of the population of the country. At that time, the rest of the electricity distribution in the 
country was carried out by state public companies and small local cooperatives. San Luis was the 
first provincial government to grant concessions for its distribution of electricity in 1993, 
followed by Santiago del Estero, La Rioja, Tucuman, and Formosa in 1995. In 1996, ESEBA, 
the second-largest company after SEGBA, was divided into three firms: EDEA, EDEN, and 
EDES. The provinces of San Juan, Jujuy, Entre Ríos, Río Negro, Salta, Catamarca, and Mendoza 
later replicated the process. Today, around 70 percent of the population is served by private 
companies (Andrés, Guasch and Foster, 2004). Table 1 and Figure 1 show the schedule of the 
privatization program. 
The comprehensive nature of the electricity reform in Argentina reflected the poor 
performance of the sector prior to privatization and the idea that the private sector could help 
achieve potential efficiency gains in terms of expanded access and improved service quality. The 
question is, have these objectives been achieved? 
 6
Access to Electricity Services 
To identify the effect of privatization on access to electricity, we exploit the fact that all the 
privatizations in electricity distribution services occurred from 1992 to 1998 (see Table 1), and 
that provincial-level census data on the proportion of households with access to electricity is 
available for the years 1991 and 2001.  
Using the 1991 and 2001 census data, we calculate the difference-in-differences estimate 
of the impact of privatization on the proportion of households that had access to electricity. We 
use census data instead of connection data from firm sources to account for the fact that many 
households had access to the electricity network via clandestine connections. 
The difference-in-differences estimator compares the change in the proportion of 
households with access to electricity in provinces that privatized to the change in the proportion 
of households with access to electricity in provinces that did not privatize electricity services. 
We exclude both the city of Buenos Aires and the province of Buenos Aires from the analysis 
since about 99 percent of households were already connected to electricity service before 
privatization. Results from the difference-in-differences estimator, reported in Table 2, show a 
larger increase in the proportion of households connected to electricity services in provinces that 
privatized than in provinces that did not. The estimated coefficient indicates that the total number 
of households with access to electricity increased by 2.3 percentage points as a result of 
privatization.  
Indeed, many authors have highlighted the positive impact of privatization on poor 
households. According to Bouille, Dubrovsky, and Maurer (2002), one of the striking 
achievements of the early years of Argentine electricity reform was the sharp increase in the 
number of poor households with electricity supply. This is likely to have had a positive impact 
on the social welfare of these households, as they often previously lacked electricity for heating, 
pumping water, and food conservation. As Pollitt (2004) indicated, “Many developing countries 
face problems of improving the access of the poorest while giving financial incentives to 
companies to supply them. Argentina handled this problem in an economically efficient way. 
The increase of access to poor consumers was calculated to have yielded large increases in social 
welfare and be a significant benefit of the restructuring of the sector.” 
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Quality of Service 
A focus on service quality requires the consideration of a variety of issues. In Argentina, 
privately-owned electricity distribution firms are responsible for any shortage of supply, 
regardless of the cause of this shortage. If interruptions reduce the quality of service below the 
minimum standards set in concession contracts, then distribution firms have to pay penalties. 
Concession contracts specify minimum standards in technical product (voltage variations), in 
technical service (duration and frequency of interruption), and in commercial service (customer 
complaints and the like). Thus, privately owned electricity distribution firms have strong 
incentives to provide an adequate quality of service. 
Table 3 presents some statistics regarding two widely used measures for quality of 
service: mean frequency of interruptions per customer (FC), defined as 1
n
i
i
Ca
FC
Cs
==
∑
 (where iCa  
is the number of customers affected by interruption i, Cs  is the total number of customers, and n 
is the total number of interruptions), and total time of interruption per customer (TC), defined as 
1
n
i i
i
Ca t
TC
Cs
=
×
=
∑
 (where it  is the duration of interruption i). As shown in Table 3, the averages of 
both FC and TC for private firms are lower than the average for public firms, which is in line 
with the idea that private firms have better quality indicators than public firms.2 
Similar conclusions are reached when considering the before/after performance (in terms 
of quality of service) of firms that were privatized. We have information on TC and FC in at 
least one year before and after privatization for five firms: EDENOR, EDESUR, EDELAP, 
EDEMSA, and EDEERSA. As shown in Table 3, TC decreased for this group of firms from an 
average of 21.72 before privatization to 9.74 after privatization. Analogously, FC decreased from 
14.15 before privatization to 6.00 after privatization. 
The number of hours of supply lost per year provides additional evidence for the increase 
in the quality of service after privatization. For the three distribution utilities in the Greater 
Buenos Aires area (the only utilities for which these data are available) the number of hours of 
supply lost per year was 21 in 1988, 16.8 in 1993/94, and 5 in 2000/01. 
                                                          
2 Of course, we are not pretending that the relation is causal. 
 8
Finally, when an interruption takes place it can be caused at the generation, transport, or 
distribution stage. One concern regarding our identification strategy was whether distribution is 
an important factor in explaining service quality. To explore the validity of this concern, we 
consulted many specialists in the electricity sector and they agreed that distribution must be 
considered as an important factor in electricity interruptions. Indeed, we have information on 
minutes of interruptions and number of customers suffering interruptions in EDELAP’s 
concession zone in 1999 and 2000, which shows that 96 percent of the minutes/customer 
interrupted and 87 percent of customers suffering interruptions were caused by problems 
originating in the distribution stage. 
Summing up, there is evidence that the privatization programs of the electricity sector 
have had an important impact on increasing both access to service and quality of service.  
The following two sections examine the potential pathways by which increasing access to 
service and quality of service can influence health outcomes.  
3. Food Quality, Nutrition, and Public Health 
The quality of food intake and health go hand in hand. Up to one-third of people in developed 
countries are affected by food-borne diseases every year. This problem is likely to be even more 
widespread in developing countries, because the poor are more susceptible to ill-health. In 
addition to food contamination, unbalanced diets lead to worsening health outcomes, especially 
in the form of growth retardation and poor cognitive development of children. This paper focuses 
on these two problems and their relationship to the quality of food intake, nutrition, and food 
poisoning, and on their impact on public health. 
Nutrition and Low Birth Weight 
A diversity of foods in a balanced diet improves nutritional status and health, thus providing 
another channel through which food impacts public health. Malnutrition and nutrition-related 
chronic conditions (ischemic heart disease, high blood pressure, and stroke, among others) are 
more prevalent among the poor. And although low-income households are usually efficient in 
feeding themselves with little resources, they spend heavily on energy-dense foods (Nelson, 
1999).  
For younger children, an unbalanced diet results in growth retardation and poor cognitive 
development. Thus, the availability of a refrigerator should have a positive impact on the 
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development of younger children by allowing them access to a more balanced diet. And better 
nutrition of the mother before and during pregnancy should reduce the probability of low birth 
weight.   
Low birth weight remains a significant public health problem in developing countries 
since it not only increases infant mortality rates, but also carries long-term risk in the form of 
high rates of adult coronary heart disease and diabetes (see Barker, 1998). Recently Almond, 
Chay, and Lee (2005) measured the benefit in the United States of an additional pound of weight 
at birth for babies weighing 2000-2100 grams to be $10,000 in saved hospital charges for 
inpatient services.   
Studies on mothers’ micronutrient consumption have shown that in addition to caloric 
intake, some micronutrients have a positive effect on birth weight. Mardones-Santander et al. 
(1988) and Rao et al. (2001) have shown with Chilean and Indian data that mothers’ 
consumption of milk fortified with folic acid and iron had a positive effect on birth weight. More 
recently, Ramakrishnan (2004) surveys the literature and finds little evidence of positive effect of 
multivitamin mineral supplements, beyond iron and iron-folate supplementation, on birth weight.  
Of course, nutrition is not the only cause of low birth weight. Cross-sectional birth weight 
variation is directly or indirectly influenced by immutable factors (genetics), socioeconomic 
factors (education, income), maternal behavior beyond nutrition (smoking behavior), and other 
environmental factors (such as infections).  
Food-Borne Diseases and Diarrheas 
Like water and sanitation, the major health burden arising from food contamination is almost 
certainly its contribution to diarrhea and dysentery, which figure so highly in the morbidity and 
mortality of children in developing countries. There is also growing evidence of the serious long-
term health effects of food-borne hazards, including kidney failure, reactive arthritis, and 
disorders of the brain and nervous system (World Health Organization, 2001). Food-borne 
diseases thus take a major toll on health, leading the World Health Organization and its member 
states to recognize food safety as an essential public health function (Fifty-third World Health 
Assembly, May 2000).  
Epidemiological studies give little indication of the relative importance of food 
contamination. An attempt to indirectly estimate the share of diarrhea resulting from food 
contamination placed this figure between 15 percent and 70 percent (Esrey and Feachem, 1989). 
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Food safety must be addressed along the entire food chain. Food contamination can occur within 
the home, and food handling and storage practices are critical.  
Food contamination takes place when germs infect non-contaminated foods, or when 
already-present colonies of germs develop under favorable conditions. The most common food-
borne diseases are salmonella, shigella, and staphylococcus. All of them, and most other food-
borne diseases, are less likely to occur if the cold chain is preserved (foods kept at more than 5 
degrees Celsius for as little as two hours can become contaminated), and if foods are cooked at 
temperatures above 70 degrees Celsius. Food contamination symptoms start a few hours after 
ingestion, and always include fever and diarrhea. Many food-borne illnesses are the result of 
improper storage. When electricity fails, refrigerated storage is a casualty, and the risk of illness 
increases. So it is likely that food poisoning cases peak as a result of power cuts. 
4. Impact of Electricity Privatization on Health in Argentina 
There are two main potential pathways by which the privatization of the Argentine electricity 
sector might have positively affected public health. The first is that the privatization fostered the 
expansion of the network, providing access to service to households that were not previously 
connected to electricity. The second is the improvement in service quality in terms of fewer 
shortages of supply. 
There are at least two channels through which the expansion of service connections (and 
the subsequent increase in refrigerator use among low-income households) and the improvement 
of service quality may have had a positive impact on public health. First, an immediate effect 
arises from the abatement of food-borne diseases. Furthermore, the richer nutritional contents 
resulting from a more varied diet should improve mothers’ micronutrient consumption, and 
reduce the negative impact of growth retardation and poor cognitive development among 
children. This second channel is related to service expansion, while the first one is related both to 
service expansion and quality improvements, given that fewer power cuts imply fewer instances 
of breaks in the cold chain.   
Of course, low-income families may not be able to afford a refrigerator (or other hygiene 
aids such as insect- and rodent-proof storage containers). But in the absence of electricity they 
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have no choice but to live without one since there is no good substitute for an electric 
refrigerator.3   
We want to study the impact of electricity distribution privatization and its subsequent 
network expansion and service quality improvements on health indicators related to food 
contamination and dietary diversity. The effects observed, if any, would come from low-income 
families having the possibility of access to a refrigerator and a lower frequency of food-borne 
diseases due to breaks in the cold chain. The health outcome used to test the “access” channel is 
the frequency of low-birth weight births. We will test for the “quality” channel by looking at 
how privatization affected hospitalizations and death rates for causes related to diarrheas and 
food poisoning. As already mentioned, it is likely that service expansion also affected this 
outcome so we will be unable to separate both channels.   
Another channel by which a blackout may impact health is through the provision of 
water. A blackout compromises the water supply in at least two ways: first, by decreasing the 
pressure in water pumps, allowing bacteria to build up in municipal water systems; second, by 
effectively shutting down sewage treatment facilities.  
These aspects were evident during an important blackout that cut power to tens of 
millions of people in the northeastern United States and eastern Canada in August 2003. During 
the blackout, New York City’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene detected a higher-
than-usual number of visits for diarrheal illnesses at emergency departments in the city. Health 
Commissioner Thomas Frieden said, “While we do not know the specific cause of this spike in 
diarrheal illnesses, it is possible that it was caused by spoiled food eaten at home or elsewhere.” 
Also, Detroit-area food poisoning claims skyrocketed during the power outage.  
This anecdotal evidence highlights the impact that inadequate quality of the electricity 
service can have on health. 
5. Data 
Our data cover the period 1990 to 2000. Given that the first privatization in the electricity sector 
in Argentina was in 1992 and the last one was in 1998, this 11-year period includes two years 
before the first privatization and two years after the last privatization. Extending the dataset 
                                                          
3 Kerosene- or gas-powered refrigerators are possible substitutes, but they are more expensive than electric ones. 
They were mainly used by medium- to high-income rural families. Survey data for the years 2004 and 2005 in 
Argentina shows that about 17 percent of households without access to electricity have a refrigerator. This figure is 
87 percent for households with access to electricity. 
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beyond 2000 might not be appropriate given the macroeconomic crisis faced by the country. 
Argentina experienced a negative shock when Brazil devalued its currency in 1999, and 
conditions deteriorated significantly after June 2001, with output falling at a rate of more than 10 
percent over the following year and a half. At the beginning of January 2002, the Argentine 
government defaulted on its debt and sanctioned the Economic Emergency Law, by which tariffs 
on utilities were “pesified,” or converted to pesos and contracts renegotiated. Concretely, Article 
8 of the Emergency Economic Law required that tariffs previously stated in U.S. dollars be 
converted to Argentine pesos at a rate of one-to-one (the previous exchange rate) and that they 
could no longer be indexed to foreign inflation. To have an idea of what this means in terms of 
the possibility of investments by private firms, in the six-month period following the pesification 
law, the Argentine peso went from being worth one U.S. dollar to being worth about 25 U.S. 
cents. The tariff freezing meant that utilities’ rates, measured in dollars, fell by up to 66 percent.  
Our main output measures are Very Low Birth Weight and Low Birth Weight, defined as 
the frequency of birth with weights below 1500 grams and 2500 grams, respectively. The latter 
measure is a standard in the health literature to gauge the importance of nutritional problems 
among newborns. It should be noted that there are some years/provinces for which the number of 
unrecorded births is high. Another output measure used in the empirical section, Diarrhea and 
Food Poisoning, is the rate of mortality caused by intestinal infections for children under 5 years 
of age.  
Our dataset also includes a privatization dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
electricity services are provided by a private company and 0 otherwise, and a set of province 
characteristics.4 The definitions and sources of all variables used in the empirical section are 
presented in Table 4. 
6. Results 
The objective is to identify the impact of privatization on measures of public health related to 
food contamination and nutritional deficiencies in those provinces where the electricity sector 
has been privatized.  
The first set of estimates is obtained using the difference-in-difference estimator, which 
compares the change in health outcomes for those provinces that privatized their electricity 
                                                          
4 In some provinces there are cooperative firms providing electricity. In all provinces that privatized their electricity 
services, the privatized firm serves more than 50 percent of all customers.  
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services to the change in health outcomes for those provinces that did not privatize their 
electricity services.  
Formally, the difference-in-differences model can be specified as 
it it it i t itY D Xβ λ α μ ε= + + + +    (1) 
where itY  is the output of interest (low birth weight) in a given province in period t, itX  is the 
vector of the subset of control variables in the vector X that vary both across units and time, itD  
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if province i’s electricity system was privatized 
during period t, iα  is a time-invariant province effect, tμ  is a time effect common to all 
provinces in period t, and itε  is a province time-varying error distributed independently across 
provinces and time and independently of all iα  and tμ . The parameter of interest,β , is the 
difference-in-differences estimate of the average effect of privatization on low birth weight. 
The difference-in-differences model assumes that the change in low birth weight in 
control (not-privatized) areas is an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual. While we cannot 
directly test this assumption, we can test whether time trends of low birth weight in provinces 
that privatized and provinces that did not privatize electricity services were the same in the pre-
privatization periods. If time trends are the same in the pre-intervention periods, then it is likely 
that they would have been the same in the post-intervention period had treated provinces not 
privatized. As in Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005), we estimate a model like the one in 
Equation (1) to formally test the hypothesis that the pre-intervention time trends for provinces 
that privatized and did not privatize their electricity services are not different, but we exclude the 
privatization dummy variable and we include separate year dummies for (eventual) treatments 
and controls. We use only the observations of the control and the treatment provinces before 
privatization; that is, we use data for the years 1990 to 1997 for all the control provinces and 
only the pre-privatization years for those provinces that privatized electricity services (recall that 
the last privatization was in 1998). Since the dummy variables capturing the interaction between 
the year effects and the eventually privatized electricity systems are not significant at 
conventional levels of significance, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the pre-privatization 
year dummies are the same for provinces that did privatize and provinces that did not privatized, 
thus validating our difference-in-differences identification strategy.  
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In Table 5 we present difference-in-differences estimates of the privatization of 
electricity services on the proportion of very low weight births (less than 1,500 grams). We use 
the privatization dummy lagged one period, since nutrition over the whole pregnancy affects 
weight at birth. In order to account for the presence of a common random effect at the year-state 
(public or private) level, standard errors are clustered at the year-privatized/not-privatized level 
(see Moulton, 1990).  
The first column reports the difference-in-differences model without controls, which 
shows a negative and significant association between privatization and proportion of very low 
birth weights. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that privatization is associated with a 
0.0021 decrease in the proportion of very low birth weight, which corresponds to a 21 percent 
reduction of the baseline proportion. 
One concern regarding this type of study is that there may be time-varying province 
characteristics correlated with both the weight at birth and the electricity sector being in private 
hands. To address this concern, in Column 2 we control for a number of observed time-varying 
characteristics, including GDP per capita, unemployment, income inequality, and public 
spending per capita. The coefficients on GDP per capita and public spending per capita are not 
significant at any of the usual confidence levels. As expected, income inequality has a positive 
and significant sign, suggesting that a worse distribution of province income is associated with a 
higher proportion of very low birth weights. The coefficient on unemployment rate is negative 
and significant, which is a puzzling result. The coefficient on the lagged privatization dummy 
remains negative and significant at the 5 percent level. 
In Column 3 we add a dummy variable for the political party that controlled the local 
government. We do this to control for political preferences for health outcomes beyond public 
spending levels. As reported in Column 3, the added variable is not significant and it does not 
have any impact on the estimated coefficients and significance of the other variables. 
An additional concern is that the same provinces that privatized electricity services might 
have also privatized water services, and that it is water privatization and not electricity 
privatization that is responsible for the decrease in the proportion of very low birth weights. To 
address this concern, we control for the privatization of water services by including the 
proportion of the population in the province with privatized water services as an additional 
 15
regressor.5 As reported in Column 4, the coefficient associated with the privatization of water 
services is not significant. The coefficient of the lagged privatization dummy remains negative 
and significant at the 10 percent level.  
As shown in Columns 6–9, similar results are obtained when we define low birth weight 
as the proportion of births under 2,500 grams instead of the proportion of births under 1500gr. 
The magnitude of the coefficients indicates that privatization is associated with a decrease in the 
proportion of low birth weight in the range of 0.0028 to 0.0044, which corresponds to a 
reduction of the baseline proportion in the range of 3.7 percent to 5.8 percent. 
To conclude, two caveats should be considered when interpreting these results. First, as 
pointed out by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), difference-in-differences estimates 
may suffer from a potential problem of serial correlation of the error term. To avoid potential 
biases in the estimation of the standard errors arising from serial correlation, we allow for an 
arbitrary covariance structure within provinces over time by computing standard errors clustered 
at the province level. When we compute standard errors corresponding to the estimates reported 
in Table 5 in this way, the coefficients on privatization become not significant at conventional 
levels of confidence. This may be related to the small number of cross-section observations (i.e., 
provinces) that we had.  
Second, in some years and for some provinces there is a large proportion of infants not 
weighed at birth. As shown in Columns 5 and 10, when we exclude from the sample those 
observations where the proportion of infants weighed at birth is less than 70 percent (12 
observations), the coefficients on privatization become not significant at conventional levels of 
confidence. More worrisome is the fact that the magnitude of coefficients changes dramatically, 
suggesting that these observations may be driving previous results. 
Overall, difference-in-differences estimates provide weak evidence that privatization is 
negatively associated with low birth weight.  
Food Poisoning 
Table 6 presents the results of the food-poisoning pathway by which privatization might have a 
positive impact on health. The dependent variable is the child mortality rate caused by diarrhea 
and food poisoning. It is measured as the ratio of the number of deaths caused by diarrhea and 
                                                          
5 Municipalities, not provinces, are responsible for delivering water services.  
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food poisoning in children under 5 years of age to the total number of children under 5 alive at 
the beginning of the year. We focus on young children because they are particularly vulnerable 
to diseases related to food poisoning as a result of weak body defenses.  
As reported in Column 1 of Table 6, in the difference-in-differences model without 
controls we find a negative though not significant association between the two variables.  
To further explore the association between privatization and child mortality rate caused 
by diarrhea and food poisoning, in Column 2 we include the number of days with temperatures 
above 30 degrees Celsius and its interaction with the privatization dummy as additional controls. 
In Column 3 we additionally control for GDP per capita, unemployment, income inequality, and 
public spending per capita. In Column 4 we add a dummy variable for the political party that 
controlled the provincial government, and in Column 5 we include the proportion of the 
population in the province with privatized water services. The pattern of our results is similar to 
the one obtained for the nutrition pathway, in the sense that the coefficient of the lagged 
privatization dummy becomes not significant when we cluster the standard errors at the province 
level. 
Additional Evidence 
Finally, we use survey data provided by the Ministry of Health in order to estimate the impact of 
the privatization of electricity services on households’ probability of owning a refrigerator. The 
survey covers 30,000 households all around the country and includes data on nutritional status. 
The survey identifies households with unmet basic needs, and household income is captured 
through a categorical variable that distinguishes whether the household is indigent, poor but not 
indigent, or not poor. We translated this information into two dummy variables, one for poor but 
not indigent households, and the other for non-poor households.  
We run a probit regression for the probability of owning a refrigerator against a set of 
dummy variables: income, unmet basic needs, access to the electricity network, and province 
with a private electricity provider. As additional control variables we include province GDP, the 
number of days with temperatures above 30 degrees Celsius, and income inequality. As reported 
in Table 7, the privatization dummy has a positive and significant effect. Its coefficient indicates 
that living in a province where electricity distribution has been privatized is associated, ceteris 
paribus, with an increase of about 2.2 percentage points in the probability of owning a 
refrigerator. Although just a correlation, and given that we control for electricity access, this 
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result is consistent with the idea that privatization led to an improvement in service quality, 
inducing households to buy refrigerators.  
7. Conclusions 
The central hypothesis of this study is that service expansions and quality improvements 
associated with the privatization of electric companies in Argentina have had a positive effect on 
health outcomes.  
In order to test our main hypothesis we first show that access to the electricity service 
increased more in those provinces that privatized their electricity distribution networks than in 
provinces where distribution remained public. We also present some evidence supporting the 
idea that private firms have better quality indicators than public firms. 
Having provided evidence on the impact of privatization on increasing both access to the 
service and quality of the service, we explore the pathways. First, by increasing access to 
electricity, privatization allows a number of households to have a refrigerator, which may 
improve nutrition intake. Our empirical results show some evidence that in provinces where 
electricity distribution was privatized, the frequency of low birth weights (our measure of 
nutrition) decreases relative to provinces with public distribution networks, though the results are 
not robust to accounting for the potential problem of serial correlation in our data. 
Second, by reducing the frequency and duration of interruptions, privatization may have 
an impact on the likelihood of food poisoning. As before, our empirical results show some 
evidence that provinces with privatized electricity systems have lower child mortality rates 
caused by food poisoning, though the results are not robust to correcting for correlation in our 
data.  
We also find a positive and significant correlation between privatization and the 
probability of a household owning a refrigerator, a result that is consistent with the idea that 
privatization led to an improvement in service quality, inducing households to buy refrigerators. 
The indirect benefits of electricity service privatization on health outcomes are not strong 
enough to provide policy implications beyond those implied by the results on access and service 
quality. The weakness of our results, however, might be a consequence of the low number of 
cross-section observations arising from working with province-level data in Argentina. Further 
research is needed in order to try to establish a causal effect of electricity privatization on health. 
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Table 1. Time Schedule of the Electricity Privatization Program  
Year Privatized firms 
1992 EDENOR, EDESUR, and EDELAP 
1993 EDESAL 
1995 EDELAR, EDESE, EDET, and EDEFOR 
1996 EDESA, ESJSA, EDEERSA, EDERSA, EJESA, 
and EDECAT 
1997 EDEA, EDEN, and EDES 
1998 EDEMSA 
 Source: Secretaría de Energía. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Impact of Privatization on the Proportion of Households 
with Access to the Electricity Network 
 
 Proportion of 
households connected 
in 1991 
Proportion of 
households connected 
in 2001 
Difference  
2001 – 1991 
Provinces that did not 
privatize 
0.893 0.943 0.050 
Provinces that 
privatizeda 
0.859 0.933 0.073 
   0.023 
Note: There is no sample variability when we estimate the proportion of households with access to 
electricity networks for the years 1991 and 2001 since these proportions are estimated from Census 
data. 
a We exclude Buenos Aires since about 99 percent of households were already connected to electricity 
service before privatization. 
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Table 3. Quality of Service 
 Mean frequency of interruption per 
customer (FC) 
Total time of interruption per 
customer (TC) 
 Number of 
observations 
Average Number of 
observations 
Average 
Public firms 10 40.79 9 20.51 
Private firms 44 6.10 44 9.69 
Total 54 12.52 53 11.52 
Before privatization 8 14.15 8 21.72 
After privatization 38 6.00 38 9.74 
Source: Own calculations. Public firms: EPESF (2001), EDELAP (1991, 1992), EDENOR (1992), EDESUR 
(1992), SECHEEP (1992, missing information on TC), EDEERSA (1996), and EDEMSA (1995-1997). Privatized 
firms: EDELAP (1993-2001), EDENOR (1993-2001), EDESUR (1993-2001), EDEERSA (1997-2002), EDEMSA 
(1998-2002), and ESJ (1997-2002). 
 
 
Table 4. Data Sources and Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Low birth weight Proportion of infants born weighing less than 
2500 or 1500 grams 
Ministerio de Salud 
Diarrhea and food 
poisoning 
Child mortality rate caused by intestinal 
infections  
Ministerio de Salud 
Private Dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest 
fraction of the population has electricity services 
provided by a private company, and 0 otherwise 
Secretaría de Energía 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate (May and October average) 
for households in the surveyed cities of the 
province. There is no record for the province of 
Rio Negro 
Permanente Household 
Survey, INDEC 
Real GDP per capita Per capita gross geographic product in hundreds 
of constant pesos 
Permanente Household 
Survey, INDEC 
Income inequality Gini index (May and October average) for 
households in the surveyed cities of the province 
Permanente Household 
Survey, INDEC 
Public spending per capita Current public spending per capita in hundreds 
of constant pesos (1993) 
INDEC 
Peronist Dummy variable that equals 1 if the province is 
governed by the Peronist party, or if the 
company providing electricity services depends 
on the federal government, and 0 otherwise 
Ministerio del Interior 
Share of water 
privatization 
Proportion of the population in the province 
with privatized water services 
Galiani, Gertler, and 
Schargrodsky (2005) 
Temperature Number of days with a high temperature above 
30 degrees C 
CIM, Servicio 
Meteorológico Nacional 
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Table 5. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of Privatization 
of the Electricity Sector on Low Birth Weight 
 
 Dependent variable: Birth weight 
 Proportion less than 1,500gr Proportion less than 2,500gr 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Private electricity servicet-1 -.0021 -.0023 -.0024 -.0020 -.0001 -.0027 -.0043 -.0043 -.0036 -.0007 
 (.0008)** (.0009)** (.0010)** (.0010)* (.0004) (.0019) (.0017)** (.0019)** (.0018)* (.0007) 
 [.0026] [.0027] [.0027] [.0025] [.0004] [.0053] [.0056] [.0057] [.0053] [.0012] 
% Δ  in proportion of low birth 
weight 
-21.37 -23.44 -24.36 -20.25 -1.30 -3.70 -5.77 -5.78 -4.91 -0.93 
Ln(Real GDP per capita)  -.0030 -.0026 -.0029 .0008  .0157 .0157 .0153 .0014 
  (.0039) (.0037) (.0037) (.0020)  (.0165) (.0160) (.0162) (.0041) 
  [.0054] [.0052] [.0046] [.0014]  [.0136] [.0135] [.0139] [.0042] 
Unemployment rate  -.0239 -.0230 -.0213 -.0027  -.0360 -.0358 -.0331 -.0196 
  (.0078)*** (.0077)*** (.0087)** (.0048)  (.0364) (.0349) (.0351) (.0103)* 
  [.0194] [.0189] [.0183] [.0063]  [.0423] [.0416] [.0407] [.0111]* 
Income inequality  .0826 .0831 .0784 -.0038  .1922 .1923 .1848 .0136 
  (.0372)** (.0380)** (.0353)** (.0061)  (.0763)** (.0764)** (.0735)** (.0121) 
  [.0658] [.0659] [.0624] [.0068]  [.1171] [.1177] [.1120] [.0220] 
Ln(Public spending   .0059 .0055 .0057 .0001  .0081 .0081 .0083 -.0015 
per capita)  (0053) (0053) (0053) (.0010)  (.0081) (.0083) (.0081) (.0033) 
  [.0050] [.0049] [.0050] [.0014]  [.0083] [.0084] [.0088] [.0033] 
Province governed   -.0008 -.0005 -.0001   -.0001 -.0002 -.0007  
by Peronist party   (.0005) (.0006) (.0004)   (.0021) (.0023) (.0012) 
   [.0008] [.0007] [.0004]   [.0015] [.0014] [.0008] 
Share of water privatization    .0038 -.0002    -.0061 .0004 
    (.0023) (.0003)    (.0041) (.0011) 
    [.0025] [.0004]    [.0051] [.0016] 
Observations 242 230 230 230 218 242 230 230 230 218 
Notes: All regressions include year and province fixed effects, and exclude Buenos Aires since about 99 percent of households were already connected to 
the service before privatization. Mean values of low birth weight in 1990 are 0.010 (<1500gr) and 0.076 (<2500gr). Standard errors clustered at the year-
private level are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in brackets. *Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 
percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact 
of Privatization of the Electricity Sector on Child Mortality Rates 
Caused by Diarrhea and Food Poisoning 
 
 Dependent variable:  
Child mortality rates caused by diarrhea and food poisoning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private electricity servicet-1 -.000015 -.000078 -.000091 -.000088 -.000083 
 (.000015) (.000025)*** (.000033)** (.000032)** (.000036)**
* 
 [.000027] [.00009] [.00008] [.000080] [.000068] 
Temperature  -5.85e-07 -6.00e-07 -5.06e-07 -4.87e-07 
  (4.01e-07) (4.32e-07) (3.97e-07) (3.90e-07) 
  [5.18e-07] [5.57e-07] [5.39e-07] [5.13e-07] 
Temperature*Private electricity 
servicet-1 
 6.41e-07 8.24e-07 7.50e-07 7.18e-07 
  (1.95e-07)*** (2.99e-
07)** 
(2.73e-
07)** 
(2.37e-
07)*** 
  [7.17e-07] [7.53e-07] [6.93e-07] [6.27e-07] 
Ln(Real GDP per capita)   .00020 .00022 .00022 
   (.00006)*** (00007)*** (00007)*** 
   [.00010]* [.00010]** [.00010]** 
Unemployment rate   -.00016 -.00012 -.00011 
   (.00018) (.00019) (.00019) 
   [.00037] [.00038] [.00039] 
Income inequality   -.00051 -.00049 -.00052 
   (.00025)* (.00027)* (.00026)* 
   [.00055] [.00053] [.00053] 
Ln(Public spending per capita)   .00018 .00017 .00017 
   (.00008)** (.00008)* (.00008)* 
   [.00018] [.00018] [.00018] 
Province governed by Peronist party    -.00004 -.00004 
    (.00002)* (.00002)* 
    [.00002]* [.00002]* 
Share of water privatization     -.000017 
     (.00002) 
     [.000041] 
Observations 264 264 252 252 252 
Notes: All of the regressions include year and province fixed effects. The mean values of child mortality rate 
caused by diarrhea and food poisoning in 1990 is 0.00025. Standard errors clustered at the year-private level are 
in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 7. Impact of Privatization on the Probability of Having a Refrigerator 
 Dependent variable:  
household with a refrigerator (=1) 
Private electricity service in the province .0212 
 (.0081)*** 
Temperature in the province -.0001 
 (.0001) 
Ln(Real GDP per capita of the province) .0284 
 (.0089)*** 
Household with access to the electricity service .4805 
 (.0471)*** 
Income inequality -.0039 
 (.0021)* 
Household with unmet basic needs -.1687 
 (.0058)*** 
Poor household (but not indigent) .0493 
 (.0051)*** 
Not-poor household .1242 
 (.0085)*** 
Observations 24,432 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. We report marginal effects. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 
percent level. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of provinces with privatized electricity 
systems
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